Counterfeiting is one of the most serious problems in the consumer market. One promising approach for anti-counterfeiting is to attach a low-cost Radio-frequency Identification (RFID) tag to the product authentication. In this paper, we propose an RFID system for detecting counterfeiting products. This RFID system consists of the tag authentication protocol and the database correction protocol. We use the tag authentication protocol for authenticating tags without revealing their sensitive information. This protocol also allows the customer to freely inquire the tag. To prevent the widespread of the counterfeit products, we use the tag status information along with tag identity information. Meanwhile, the database correction protocol guarantees the correctness of the tag status. Our anti-counterfeiting system is the first work considering the seller who plays an important role in the consumer product supply chain. Finally, we show that anti-counterfeiting system is quite secure against counterfeiting and the tag authentication protocol is lightweight enough to be implemented in RFID-based applications.
Introduction
Counterfeiting product is one of the serious problems that most product manufacturers and customers have to confront. The intent to make counterfeiting products is to take advantage of the original value of the genuine products. According to the report of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the global market loss due to counterfeiting products reaches $1.7 trillion by 2015 [1] . As a result, several countermeasure solutions have been proposed such as the barcodes, the hologram stickers, and the Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags.
Among the aforementioned countermeasures, RFID technology is the most viable solution for product anticounterfeiting due to the difficulty for the adversary to access to the sensitive information, e.g., the tag identity and the tag authenticity, of the RFID tag. Typically, each tag is equipped with an authentication protocol which provides more rigorous access control to the tag information. The verifier has to successfully pass the authentication
Related Work
In recent years, researchers have been proposed numerous RFID-based systems for solving the counterfeiting problem [4] [5] [7] [11] . Their RFID systems consist of three parties: the server, the reader, and the RFID tag. They consider the reader and the server as an integrated entity. They assume that the communication channel between them are secure.
Although the mutual authentication protocols allow the two parties to authenticate each other, they also require the RFID tag to do more computational tasks such as random number generation and tag identity number update [6] [9] [12] . Paradoxically, most of the RFID tags belong to low-cost passive class, which means they have limited hardware resources and need the power supplied from the reader's radio energy.
Additionally, the mutual authentication protocols [9] [13]- [15] usually need to update and synchronize the secret information shared between the tag and the server database after each authentication session. The adversary can exploit this task to destroy the functionality of the tag by de-synchronizing the common information shared between the server database and the tag [4] [16]- [18] . As a result, we only need tag-side authentication RFID system which can prevent counterfeiting problem while allowing the customer (the reader) to freely inquire the tag without the need to update the common information shared between the tag and the server database.
In terms of tag-side authentication, several schemes have been proposed [2] [3]. However, several limitations makes them inappropriate for use in the retailing system. Typically, the OSK protocol [2] suffers from the de-synchronization problem due to the update operation between the tag and the server database after each authentication session. Although this problem has been solved in the work of Godor et al. [6] , their protocol is mutual authentication category, and hence it is not suitable for the context of retailing system. Our work can be considered as a variant of the Feldhofer et al. scheme [3] which is ISO/IEC 9798-2 unilateral authentication standard. However, this scheme uses AES encryption for providing the proof of identity. Note that AES encryption primitive is not compatible for lightweight application, especially for RFID tag [19] . Therefore, this scheme is not practical in the retailing system.
The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting System

System Model
The RFID tag, the reader, the server, and the seller are the four parties of the RFID anti-counterfeiting system. Each RFID tag, attached on a product, stores the unique _ t id and the corresponding secret . The reader is a device used by the customer to verify if a product is genuine. A reader might be a smart phone with the authentication protocol downloaded from the product manufacturer. The product manufacturer (the tag issuer) maintains a database of the tags. The entities of the database are the tag identification number _ t id , the secret S , the tag status _ t status , and the seller name _ s name . Each tag has unique _ t id and the corresponding secret .The tag status _ t status is either unsold or sold . When issuing a tag, the product manufacturer assigns _ t status to unsold in the server database. The server uses the database to authenticate and to maintain the status of tags. Whenever a product is shipped to a seller, the information of the tag is created to the database as shown in Table 1 .
The tag authentication protocol and the database correction protocol are the two protocols in the RFID anti-counterfeiting system. Through the tag authentication protocol, the sever verifies if a specific product is genuine. Then the sever notifies the result (either valid or invalid ) to the reader. In this protocol, the server checks two things. One is to check whether the inquired product has been already sold out. If this is the case, the server sends the message invalid to the reader. Another one is to check whether the tag stores the secret S as same as the one stored in the server database. If both secrets do not match, the server also sends the message invalid . The message implies that the product is a fake. The server sends the message valid to the reader only when the product is unsold and the tag's secret is matched as well.
In this RFID anti-counterfeiting system, the server always updates the database by changing the tag status for any inquired product. By doing this, the system prevents selling fake products with the same tag identification number more than once. However, a customer may visit a shop checking the genuineness of several products and leaves without buying anything. In this case, the database needs to be corrected by changing the tag status from sold to unsold . This can be done by the database correction protocol. The server finds the seller of an inquired product from the database and sends him the tag identification number. If the product has been actually sold out, the seller does not need to do anything. Otherwise, the seller sends the message to the sever that the product is not sold out. If this is the case, the server updates the database by changing the tag status back to unsold . Table 2 shows the notations used in the protocol.
The Tag Authentication Protocol
The players of the RFID tag authentication protocol are the server, the reader, and the tag. The purpose of this protocol is to verify if a product is genuine. The reader initiates the protocol by sending a query to the tag. The query consists of two numbers, a tag identification number _ t id and a random number 1 R . The _ t id can be found from the sticker on the product. Then the tag checks if the received _ t id matches with its own tag identification number. If so, the tag computes the response 1 ( _ , , ) X F t id R S = and sends X to the reader. If not, the tag does not respond and the protocol terminates. Here the function F is a one-way function, which is described in Section 4. If the reader receives the response X from the tag, it generates another random number 2 R . And then the reader sends 1 2
, which is the encryption of four numbers, 1 _ , , t id X R and 2 R by the server's public key Mu . By this encryption, only the server knows the second random number 2 R . After receiving the encrypted message 1 2
from the reader, the server decrypts it using his private key Mr . The server checks if the database has the tag information corresponding to _ t id . If not, the server does nothing and the protocol terminates. If so, then the server checks the tag status. If the tag status is sold , the server sends the message 1.4 The function F is a one-way function with three inputs: _ t id , random 1 R , and S .
Protocol messages.
The protocol involves four messages The reader  the tag:
The reader  the tag:
The reader  the server:
The reader  the server:
Protocol actions. The tag is authenticated as follows 3.1 The reader chooses a random 1 R , and sends (1) to the tag. , and sends X to the reader. Otherwise, the tag terminates the protocol. 3.3 The reader generates a random 2 R , encrypts 1 2 _ , , , t id X R R with Mu , and sends (3) to the server. (4) to the reader. Otherwise, the server sends (5) to the reader. Finally, the server terminates the protocol.
The Database Correction Protocol
The seller and the server are the two players of the database correction protocol. The server uses this protocol to request the seller report the current status of the tag inquired by the reader. After the inquiry from the reader, the server changes the tag status _ t status from unsold to sold in the database. If the customer buys the product with this tag, the tag status _ t status sold = is correct, and the server does not need to update the database. However, if that product is not sold out, _ t status should be changed back to unsold . To do this, the server has to correct _ t status unsold = in its database before the next authentication session. For increasing the security of the protocol, the server and the seller use the public key infrastructure to exchange their messages. We assume that their public keys Mu and Su are distributed by a trusted certificate authority (CA).
For requesting the seller to report the current status of the inquired tag, the server sends the seller the message Mu E t id R unsold   , the server decrypts it, and check received 3 R with the original version (the 3 R generated by the server). If they are matched, the server updates the database. Otherwise, the server terminates the protocol without updating the database. The use of 3 R guarantees that the message
, is sent from the legitimate seller. The database correction protocol is described follows. Remark 1. By changing _ t status to for all of the inquired tags, the adversary-who can make a large number of counterfeit tags (products) with the same _ t id -could only sell at most one counterfeit product before the server changes the tag status _ t status to sold . Once a product has sold status, this fact discourages the customer's willingness to buy this product. Thus, the customer might not buy it, or buy it with a price significantly cheaper than the $unsold$ product. Note that the adversary only gets benefit from counterfeit products when he sella large number of them. Hence, it is not worth for him to sell only one fake product. Therefore, our anticounterfeiting system reduces the market loss significantly in the case when the secret S is disclosed to the adversary.
Protocol 2. Database correction protocol SUMMARY:
Update the tag status _ t status in the server database after each tag authentication session
Setup
1.1 Both the server and the seller share their public keys Mu and Su , respectively, through a trusted CA. 1.2 This protocol occurs after an unsold genuine tag is authenticated. The server needs to know if the product attaching this tag is actually sold. 1.3 _ t id is the identity number of the tag of which the server needs to update the tag status _ t status .
Protocol messages. The protocol involves two messages
The server the seller:
The server the seller:
3. Protocol actions. The server updates its database as follows 3.1 The server chooses a random 3 R , encrypt the 3 _ t id R  with the seller's public key Su , and sends (1) to the seller.
3.2 The seller decrypts (1) with his private key Sr . If the product having this _ t id was sold, the seller sends (2) to the server. Otherwise, the seller sends (3) to the server. 3.3 If the server receives (2), he decrypts it with his private key Mr and checks 3 R value with the 3 R version (1). If they match, the server updates _ t status corresponding to _ t id .
Remark 2. The seller involves in the RFID system for updating the tag status _ t status from unsold to sold after a tag is inquired by the customer. As we explain in Remark 1, the customer is unwilling to buy a product having sold tag status even though it is a genuine one. However, the server always changes _ t status to sold every time a tag is inquired by a customer by using a reader. Hence, we need the seller to change _ t status back to unsold -via the database correction protocol (Protocol 2)-when the product with this tag is still in the shop (Note that the reader can only check the product's status). As well, the sold fake product can be identified immediately when the server notifies the legitimate seller of product through the database correction protocol.
Function F
The successful probability of figuring out the inputs of F from the output must be negligible. This is the most important requirement for F . Specifically, the tag uses the output X of 1 ( _ , , ) F t id R S to prove his knowledge about the secret S in the tag authentication protocol. If the tag is legitimate, i.e., it has the correct secret S corresponding to _ t id , the tag can compute the ( ) 1 _ , , F t id R S accurately. However, because the adversary can eavesdrop X in Protocol 1 (step 3.2), it must be impossible for the adversary to figure out S from X . Further, for authenticating the tag, the server only needs to verify the correctness of X instead of getting back S from X . F must be lightweight enough for use in low-cost RFID tags as well. Specifically, the number of logic gates (GE) used for implementing F must be less than 2000 GEs, which is the hardware budget for the security function in the RFID tag [8] [20] . Therefore, F must be lightweight and secure one-way function. With this principal, we can choose an appropriate hash function having a decent collision and pre-image resistant level for our RFID system.
Recently, there are numerous lightweight hash function such as PHOTON [21] , QUARK [22] and SPONGENT [23] . Among these lightweight hash functions, we choose SPONGENT-128 (128-bit output) as it requires the smallest number of GEs for implementation while providing decent collision and pre-image resistance level for RFID-based applications. Specifically, SPONGENT-128, PHOTON -128, and QUARK-128 require 1122, 1379, and 1060 GEs, respectively. Further, SPONGENT-128 provides 120-bit collision resistance and 64-bit pre-image security, which is strong enough for RFID-based applications.
To adapt the SPONGENT-128 hash function in our RFID system, _ t id is assigned as the initial value of F while the random number 1 R is concatenated with the secret S before being processed by F . The bit-size of S should be smaller than the memory size of the tag, but must be long enough to prevent the brute-force search attack. As the memory of the popular low-cost tag is up to 512 bits [24] [25], we choose the size of S is at least 128 bits, which satisfies both the memory size and the security requirement.
Security Analysis
Adversarial Model
The adversary will exploit the weaknesses of the RFID system to achieve malicious goals. In [8] , the authors classify adversaries based on their goals, level of interference, and available resources. In our model, we assume that there are two major goals of the potential adversary: 1) to counterfeit tags by stealing the secret information of the tags; 2) to corrupt the system functionality by attacking the server database. Additionally, the adversary can be a dishonest seller, who wants to sell counterfeit products along with the genuine ones. Depending on the specific goal of the adversary, the damage of the RFID system is different. If goal (1) is accomplished, the tags of the RFID system will be suffered from being counterfeited, thus, a large number of fake products will be produced. Meanwhile, if goal (2) is successful, the server functionality, and the tag status will be corrupted, and hence, the RFID system cannot provide its authentication service for the honest customers and the honest sellers.
RFID Tag Counterfeit
To counterfeit an RFID tag, the adversary must know the secret S corresponding to the tag number _ t id . During authentication session, the reader and the tag transfer 1 _ , t id R and X , the output of F . Therefore, the adversary can use brute-force search technique to figure out S from 1 _ , t id R and X. Specifically, the adversary tries to search for the whole value space of S . Recall that S is at least 128-bit length (Section 4), thus this length satisfies the key-size requirement according to the report on key lengths from ECRYPT II [26] and from NIST [27] [28] . Therefore, it is impossible for the adversary to do brute-force key search to find out S .
Because F operates as a hash function, the adversary can get S by using the collision or the pre-image attacks, which are popular attacks on hash function [29] . Typically, in the collision attack, the adversary tries to find two distinct inputs S and S ′ such that 1 1 ( _ , , ) ( _ , , )
In the pre-image attack, given X produced by F , the adversary tries to find any S such that 1 ( _ , , ) F t id R S . However, F is a cryptographic one-way function which has decent collision resistance and pre-image security level, as shown in Section 4.Thus, it is difficult for the adversary to find out an arbitrary S value different from the original S value inside the RFID tag, which can cause F to generate the same X value. In other words, the probability for the adversary to find out S from , _ X t id , and 1 R is negligible.
Server Impersonation
To sell fake products, a dishonest seller must deceive a customer's reader through the tag authentication protocol.
To do this, he needs to make a fake server which generates the valid message 2 ( , ) valid R for the reader's inquiry. Here, 2 R is the random number chosen by the reader. This 2 R is encrypted by the legitimate server's public key Mu , and then sent to the server. Hence, the seller cannot figure out 2 R because he does not know the server's private key Mr . This means that his fake server cannot generate the valid message 2 ( , ) valid R .
Seller Impersonation
An adversary may impersonate the legitimate seller. His goal is to corrupt the server's database by keeping the tag status of the sold product as unsold . If this is the case, the impersonated seller (the adversary) can sell several counterfeit products with the same tag number _ t id .The only possible way is to send the message
for the sold product with _ t id through the database correction protocol. 
Database Spoiling Attack
Since the server always assigns _ t status to sold after the tag authentication protocol, the adversary who impersonates as a customer can exploit this fact to spoil the server database by requesting the server to authenticate a large number of genuine and unsold tags. Therefore, the honest seller cannot sell the products attaching these tags anymore. However, the seller can continue to sell these unsold products (these inquired tags) by requesting the server to correct _ t status in the database through the database correction protocol.
Denial of Service Attack
Because anyone can freely request the server to authenticate the tag, the adversary can exploit this characteristic to conduct the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. However, we can efficiently mitigate this problem by asking the reader to solve the CAPTCHA puzzle [30] for each time the reader inquires the server. Specifically, between step 3.3 and 3.4 in the tag authentication protocol (Protocol 1), the server asks the reader to solve a CAPTCHA puzzle. Unless the reader solve this puzzle correctly, the server dose not proceed step 3.4. This additional procedure prevents the reader-which is controlled by the adversary-from automatically and continuously inquiring the server.
Protocol Efficiency and Customer Usability Analysis
Protocol Efficiency Analysis
In the tag authentication protocol, function F is the main operation which the tag has to handle. Following the choice in Section 4, the F function requires 1060 GEs, which satisfies the hardware resource constraints for the low-cost RFID tag [8] [20] . In terms of number of operations, the tag has to handle one F operation; the reader has to handle one random number generation and one encryption operation; and the server has to handle one search operation, one F operation, and one decryption operation. Additionally, the database correction protocol only requires one encryption operation and one random number generation for the server and one decryption operation for the seller. As both the server and the seller have enough computational power to handle the pub-lic-key encryption, the practicality of the system is guaranteed.
Customer Usability Analysis
Our proposed RFID system increases the usability for the customer as he can freely request the server to authenticate the tag without needing to identify himself to the server. The customer only needs to get the server's public key and send the tag identification number printed on the product for authentication. Further, the customer can use any device that can communicate with the tag and handle the public-key encryption scheme to communicate with the server as a reader.
Conclusion
We have proposed an RFID anti-counterfeiting system, which is secure against the RFID tag counterfeit, the server impersonation, the seller impersonation, and the database spoiling attack. Our system not only can detect the counterfeit tag, but also reduces the market loss due to the counterfeit problem. Next, we strengthen the anti-counterfeiting capability of our system by changing the database update permission to the seller who is identified and authenticated by the server, instead of the reader. Consequently, our system improves the usability for the customer by removing the reader-side (the server-side) authentication, thus the customer can freely inquire the tag and the server in the tag authentication protocol. Finally, our system is practical as the tag only has to handle the one-way function F , which is compatible with the low-cost RFID tag.
